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INTRODUCTION 
Whistleblowers are not among the actors who populate academic 
accounts of corporate governance. Nor are whistleblowers visible in formal 
governance frameworks consisting of legal and non-legal elements that 
enable a firm to operate, all traceable to a corporation’s charter and bylaws 
adopted in compliance with the law of the state of incorporation.1 Within a 
corporation, whistleblowers may be lower-rank employees, not directors or 
officers; they may report their perceptions of wrongdoing to others within 
the corporation or inform governmental or other actors who are externally 
 
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to Laurel 
Salisbury (Duke Law J.D. 2021) for excellent research assistance, and to Veronica Root Martinez, 
Andrew Tuch, and participants at the conference for their helpful comments. 
1. For this definition, see Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 5–6 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-
Georg Ringe eds., 2018). For a rare exception of scholarship tying whistleblowing explicitly to corporate 
governance, see Uboho Inyang, Whistleblowing as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: A Comparative 
Analysis of Employee-Whistleblower Protection in the United Kingdom and Nigeria (Jan. 25, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547899. Some scholars engage with the distinct 
roles and responsibilities of lawyers as gatekeepers, including duties to report-upward evidence of 
material violations of law. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
411, 422 (2008). These inquiries run alongside scholarship on corporate governance, which does not 
appear to incorporate them. 











situated. Nonetheless, it is striking how often retrospective accounts of 
corporate scandals involve episodes of whistleblowing associated with 
governance and compliance failures in one form or another.2 An influential 
quantitative study of major financial frauds found that, in the aggregate, 
actors outside the traditional governance cast of characters and formally-
appointed gatekeepers accounted for a substantial share of fraud detection, 
prompting the authors’ observation that it “takes a village” to discern the 
presence of much fraudulent activity.3  
Focusing primarily on internal whistleblowing, this article argues that 
incorporating whistleblowers into formal governance structures could spur 
more proactive involvement by directors in monitoring compliance with law 
and regulation. Whistleblowing is significant to internal compliance 
functions because it reveals private information suggestive of wrongdoing,4 
often furnished by actors within an organization who are not subject to 
duties to blow the whistle. Credible whistleblowers create friction that 
abrades the plausibility of officially sanctioned narratives. Their reports 
(especially when ignored) can furnish valuable documentation in after-the-
fact investigations of corporate fraud and other major compliance failures, 
as can retaliation against whistleblowers.5 By charging the board with 
responsibility for adopting and overseeing the implementation of 
compliance policies with whistleblower components—as one state has 
done6—formal organizational statutes would underscore the importance of 
proactive engagement by directors and increase the likelihood that 
whistleblower reports would be used more effectively. To be sure, 
whistleblowers can be mistaken and may act from a mixture of motives, 
with the consequence that whistleblowing comes with costs as well as 
benefits.7 Thus, how best to structure a whistleblowing policy and handle 
reports should fall within the board’s exercise of good faith business 
judgment. 
The principal value of internal whistleblowing stems from its creation of 
friction, whether to gain the attention of higher-level executives or internal 
compliance functions and personnel; internal reports may also be tied to 
 
2. For examples, see Veronica Root Martinez, Complex Compliance Investigations, 120 
COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2020). 
3. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213 (2010). In particular, employees, the media, and industry regulators, not 
present in traditional accounts of corporate governance, accounted for forty-three percent of the cases in 
which major frauds were detected. Id. at 2226.  
4. Geoffrey Parsons Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, at 981, 995. 
5. See infra text accompanying note 18. 
6. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-b (LexisNexis 2021). 













revelations to investigative news media and law-enforcement authorities, 
which complicates the analysis. To illustrate more concretely, consider one 
of recent history’s best-known whistleblowers, Tyler Schultz, who found 
his first job after graduating from Stanford at Theranos, Inc., working on 
the immunoassay team.8 Commenting later—in the wake of his 
anonymously-made report to a state regulator, revelations to a board 
member and the CEO, and extensive conversations with an investigative 
reporter, culminating in the collapse of Theranos with legal repercussions 
for its principals—Mr. Schultz divided the company into two realms.9 These 
were “the carpeted world,” inhabited by senior management, the board, and 
marketing officials, distinct from “the tiled world,” a separate domain of 
testing laboratories in which lab personnel struggled with malfunctioning 
equipment manufactured by Theranos.10 By whistleblowing, denizens of the 
tiled world can create friction for their colleagues and superiors in the 
carpeted world. Whistleblowers’ reports call into question assumed factual 
premises or disrupt a preferred narrative, whether of business success, legal 
compliance, or both. And information revealed by externally-oriented 
whistleblowing can arc over the hushed environs of the carpeted world to 
reach audiences explicitly charged with publicly-oriented missions. The 
friction that whistleblowers create can also help overcome the blind spots 
of compliance chiefs themselves who, increasingly drawn from the ranks of 
elite lawyers, may overlook risks inherent in the propensities of others to 
cheat to meet organizational metrics for performance, having themselves 
always succeeded (without cheating) when confronted by challenges.11 To 
be sure, in more neutral terms whistleblowers furnish private information 
suggestive of wrongdoing12 and serve as a mechanism to furnish 
information that alerts others to suspicions of wrongdoing.13 But the act of 
whistleblowing—potentially risky and almost always contrarian in one 
sense or another, even when required to fulfill a duty—is charged in a 
fashion that is understated by more neutral terminology, underscoring its 
propensity to generate friction. 
The article opens by examining questions of definition, contingency, 
duty, and motivation that are associated with whistleblowing.14 Definition 
 
8. Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, In His Own Words: The Theranos Whistleblower, 
YOUTUBE (May 22, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wf_2KYRPWQ [https://perma.cc.ME 
E2-7D6D]. 
9. Id. 
10. Id.  
11. Miriam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1599 (2020) (identifying 
blind spots of high-performing lawyers in connection with performance metrics that can lead others to 
cheat). 
12. Miller, supra note 4, at 995. 
13. Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 939 (2017).  
14. See infra Part I.A. 











is important within statutory structures and common law doctrines that 
protect and sometimes reward the revelation of information when requisites 
of the definition are satisfied. But not all actors referred to as 
“whistleblowers” fit within these formal definitions. Moreover, the causal 
connection between a revelation and an outcome—the detection of 
wrongdoing—can be highly contingent, as the Theranos example 
illustrates.15 Many whistleblowers are not subject to duties to report, which 
situates them outside analytic frameworks in which duty serves as the 
central structuring point.16 And what motivates an individual’s decision to 
blow the whistle is often unknowable, in particular the extent to which the 
decision stems from a calculated weighing of externally-imposed potential 
costs and benefits, as opposed to an intrinsic motivation to do the right 
thing.17 Reward and protection systems for whistleblowing implicitly reflect 
judgments about motivation but may not optimally account for the 
likelihood of adverse consequences feared or suffered by many 
whistleblowers. The next portion of the article briefly surveys the 
patchwork that comprises whistleblowing law in the United States, stressing 
that highly salient scandals generally precede the adoption of 
whistleblowing regimes.  
Against this background, the article turns to corporate law and 
governance in the United States, arguing that both are more dynamic and 
less static than some academic accounts assume. Nothing inherent to either 
corporate law or governance bars the formal incorporation of mandated 
whistleblower protection into organic organizational law. Directors’ duties 
of loyalty under contemporary Delaware law encompass invigorated 
oversight of legal and regulatory compliance. And although the posture of 
the compliance function itself—motivated by internal concerns to assure the 
appropriate use of assets but also by externally imposed governmental 
pressures—is contested within corporate governance practice and 
scholarship, its presence and impact are undeniable elements of how 
contemporary organizations function. Situated within organizational law, 
the legal regime applicable to whistleblowing would have greater coherence 
and uniformity across firms incorporated in a particular jurisdiction, 
complementing the operation of any whistleblowing laws specific to the 
firm’s industry or other circumstances. Embedded in organizational law, 
whistleblowing would also become freshly visible to lawyers who advise 
organizations and furnish an additional formal basis on which lawyers could 
 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 24–30. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 50–53. 












encourage directors to engage with compliance matters more broadly.18 
When handled by in-house legal experts, whistleblower reports can function 
as red flag indicia of obvious flaws in the company’s public disclosures, 
undergirding allegations of awareness on the part of senior managers.19 The 
link between the information revealed by internal whistleblowing and 
directors’ duties of loyalty strengthens the argument for treating 
whistleblowing as a component of corporate governance that should be 
formalized via organizational law.  
I. DEFINITIONS, CONTINGENCY, DUTY, AND MOTIVATION 
Dimensions of whistleblowing as a phenomenon range beyond the law 
but nonetheless implicate corporate governance. These include how 
whistleblowing is defined and how a whistleblower’s report may interact 
with other factors in revealing misconduct. Whistleblowers’ motivations, 
which may be mixed and are often imponderable, also raise fundamental 
questions. 
A. Definitions, General Usage, and Contingency 
How “whistleblower” is defined matters for legal purposes because the 
definition is the initial element that triggers the consequences specified by 
whistleblowing statutes or common law doctrine. For example, under the 
provision added to federal law in 2010 by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, triggering the statute’s anti-
retaliation protection requires that an individual provide “information 
relating to a violation of the securities laws” to the SEC.20 Under the 
 
18. Miller, supra note 4, at 986 (addressing the role of legal counsel in the relationship between 
directors’ duties of loyalty and compliance matters). 
19. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 2135, 2184 (2019) (identifying whistleblower reports as “[c]haracteristic red flags”). For a related 
example, see Miller, supra note 4, at 989 (discussing UBS AG v. Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig 
GMBH [2014] EWHC (Comm) 3615 (Eng.)). Senior bank officials overruled the internal compliance 
function to proceed with a risky and potentially lucrative transaction. Although officials did not bear 
direct culpability for the conduct of the intermediary, who procured the transaction by bribing the bank’s 
counterparty, the decision to proceed notwithstanding objections from compliance was likely relevant 
to the court’s determination that the bank was responsible for contracts procured through bribery. 
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), interpreted in Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 
(2018). In Digital Realty Trust, the Court acknowledged that a separate provision in Dodd-Frank does 
not require that information be conveyed to a governmental authority. Digit. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 
777; see 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1) (defining a “covered employee” as one who “provide[s] . . . information 
to the employer, the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau, or any other State, local, or Federal, 
government authority or law enforcement agency relating to” a violation of law within the CFPB’s 
jurisdiction). A draft model act released in 2020 by the North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) extends anti-retaliation protection to whistleblowers who report only internally. 
 











provision earlier enacted via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 
protection against retaliation by an employer is afforded to an individual 
who provides information or otherwise assists in an investigation of conduct 
the individual “reasonably believes constitutes a violation” of criminal fraud 
statutes, any SEC rule or regulation, or “any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders.”21 The trigger encompasses 
individuals who provide assistance to a federal regulatory or law-
enforcement agency or to Congress, or internally to any “person with 
supervisory authority over the employee.”22 Other statutes, plus 
whistleblower-protective common law doctrines, have distinct triggers as 
well.23 Also evident is a disconnect between the general usage of 
“whistleblower” and formal definitions that trigger specific consequences. 
Consider as an initial prototype, Tyler Shultz. Using a pseudonym, Mr. 
Shultz reported concerns about Theranos to the New York Department of 
Health because it ran a testing program in which Theranos participated, and 
he suspected the company’s methodology was improper.24 He also notified 
his grandfather (a Theranos director) about his concerns and later sent 
lengthy written statements of testing discrepancies to the company’s 
founder (also its CEO), to which the Chief Operating Officer (COO) 
replied.25 The COO’s dismissive and hostile tone prompted Mr. Shultz to 
resign.26 Later Mr. Shultz had extensive conversations with a reporter from 
the Wall Street Journal that confirmed the gist of the reporter’s working 
thesis about Theranos and, from an insider’s perspective, elaborated on facts 
the reporter already knew from other sources.27 The reporter credited his 
conversations with Mr. Schultz and other Theranos insiders with enabling 
him to persuade his editors to publish his first article about Theranos.28 
Holding for a moment questions about the relative causal importance of 
each of these three communications and their recipients to ultimate 
outcomes, which revealed Theranos as a sham and carried potentially 
 
See MODEL WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD & PROT. ACT § 10(1)(d) (N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASSOC. 2020), ht 
tps://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Model-Whistleblower-Award-and-Protection-Act-A 
s-Adopted-by-the-NASAA-Membership.pdf (protecting against retaliation “an individual” who does 
any lawful act “in making disclosures to a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such 
other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct) regarding matters subject to the jurisdiction of” the SEC or the state securities regulator). 
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
22. Id.  
23. See infra text accompanying notes 83–102. 
24. JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 195 
(2018). 
25. Id. at 195–96. 
26. Id. at 197. 
27. Id. at 287, 301. The reporter’s initial lead came from a practicing pathologist and amateur 
blogger, who thought Theranos’s claims “sounded too good to be true.” Id. at 219, 223. 












adverse legal consequences for its principals, Mr. Shultz is a prototypical 
whistleblower. As a lower-level employee, he reported his concerns both 
internally and to an external regulator.29 Moreover, the content concerned 
misrepresentations about testing accuracy that Theranos made to users of its 
blood-testing services and investors.30 But in this concatenated sequence, 
what most likely spelled doom for Theranos was publication of the results 
in the Wall Street Journal.31 
Some individuals termed “whistleblowers” do not match this prototype 
and may not be within the set of actors specifically protected by 
whistleblowing law. In Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG,32 revelations that 
a manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals had major lapses in regulatory 
compliance enabled its acquisition partner to exit its obligation to close their 
merger deal.33 The lapses contravened representations and warranties given 
in the merger agreement and constituted a Material Adverse Event (MAE) 
as defined in the agreement.34 Much noted by commentators as the first case 
in which a Delaware court permitted a merger partner to walk away on the 
basis of an MAE,35 the source of the revelations to the merger partner goes 
unmentioned. As characterized by the court, an anonymous “whistleblower” 
sent a letter to the prospective acquiror detailing regulatory non-compliance 
in connection with the merger target’s sole promising drug in development, 
then followed up in another letter with more details including specifics 
about deficiencies in quality assurance that contravened FDA regulations.36 
 
29. A formal explanation for why whistleblowers are often employees is that they can acquire 
information at relatively low cost, given that they gather much of it as a byproduct of their work. Dyck, 
Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2214. Other actors whose conduct may reveal the presence of fraud 
can confront much higher costs. Thus, although short-sellers may gain by trading on a belief that the 
market overvalues a security on the basis of non-public information pointing to fraud, short-sellers—as 
outsiders to the corporation—acquire salient information at higher cost than employees, plus incur the 
cost of investing capital in the short. Id. 
30. CARREYROU, supra note 24, at 273.  
31. For a narrative of events in the aftermath of publication, see id. at 282-83 (noting that 
publication “ratcheted up pressure” on the federal regulator to take action, which occurred when it 
“confirmed that there were serious problems with Theranos’s blood tests” and “deemed the problems 
grave enough to put patients in immediate danger”). 
32. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 
2018). 
33. Id. at *3. 
34. Id. at *47–62. 
35. For a selection of law-firm commentary, see Edward B. Micheletti & Arthur R. Bookout, 
Analyzing Akorn: Delaware’s First M&A Termination Under Material Adverse Effect, SKADDEN, ARPS, 
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publi 
cations/2018/10/analyzing-akorn [https://perma.cc/TRC6-KRW4]; Delaware Chancery Court Finally 
Finds an MAE, JONES DAY (Oct. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2018/10/delaware-chan 
cery-court-finally-finds-an-mae [https://perma.cc/R56Z-KHD3]; RICHARD SLACK & JOSHUA M. 
GLASSER, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, THE MATERIAL ADVERSE EFFECT LANDSCAPE AFTER 
AKORN V. FRESENIUS, https://www.weil.com/~/media/mailings/2018/q3/securities_litigation_alert_18_ 
10_30_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5A4-BPMK]. 
36. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *27. 











The merger partner presented the letters to the target and conducted its own 
investigation into the allegations.37 Clearly the revelations were 
consequential to the aftermath,38 but anonymous reports to a transaction 
partner fall outside prototypes of whistleblowing that require reporting to a 
regulator or law-enforcement authority.39 
Separately, some individuals use indirect means to draw attention to 
revelations of suspected wrongdoing, as did the Akorn whistleblower 
(assuming she or he was or had been an employee of the merger target).40 
More famously, in Dirks v. SEC, former officers of an insurance company 
that engaged in fraudulent practices were unsuccessful in activating state 
insurance regulators.41 Seeking to reveal the fraud, they shared their 
information with a securities analyst, who investigated and discussed his 
findings with clients and investors, who sold the company’s stock.42 The 
drastic price drop that followed led the state insurance authority to impound 
the company’s records.43 This was followed by a complaint from the SEC, 
which also investigated whether by sharing his findings and the insiders’ 
revelations, the analyst illegally tipped inside information to his clients and 
investors.44 The Court held that the analyst did not act illegally because the 
former officers did not act fraudulently when they tipped the analyst.45 They 
were motivated to reveal the fraud, not by the expectation of receiving a 
quid pro quo or personal gain in another form.46 In a more recent example 
of indirection, an Uber employee’s blog post—which detailed experiences 
of sexual harassment by a manager and dismissiveness from Uber’s human 
resources department—triggered board investigation, through a special 
committee, into Uber’s workplace environment and employment 
practices.47 The committee’s investigation led to structural changes at the 
board level, plus a directive that the company’s ongoing search for a new 
 
37. Id.  
38. Akorn filed a Chapter 11 petition in May 2020 to facilitate the sale of its business and resolve 
a “litigation-related overhang[].” See Akorn to Use Voluntary Chapter 11 Process to Position Business 
for Long-Term Success, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (May 20, 2020, 11:52 PM), https://www.prnewswire.co 
m/news-releases/akorn-to-use-voluntary-chapter-11-process-to-position-business-for-long-term-succes 
s-301063336.html [https://perma.cc/3R7C-6JAL]. 
39. Along the same lines, an individual identified in the media as the “whistleblower” concerning 
a particular episode of corporate wrongdoing is not necessarily the actor who brought the wrongdoing 
to light. Another actor may have already initiated a chain of events that uncovered the wrongdoing. See 
Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2218. 
40. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *2. 
41. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649 (1983). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 650. 
44. Id. at 650–51. 
45. Id. at 665–66. 
46. Id. at 667. Thus the Court did not need to resolve whether the tipping constituted a breach of 
fiduciary duty. See infra text accompanying notes 54–56. 












COO focus on candidates able to improve institutional culture.48 Although 
effective in this incident, communicating information through a blog post 
may be less targeted than the trigger defined by SOX for internal reporting 
to a person with supervisory authority.49 Moreover, the content of the blog 
post may not have implicated SOX’s focus on fraud and securities law 
violations. 
In short, not all communications referred to as instances of 
whistleblowing fit within the defined components of statutory provisions. 
Likewise, the causal links between a whistleblower report and any particular 
outcome can be complex even when—but for the information provided by 
the whistleblower—the outcome most likely would not have occurred, at 
least not as soon as it did.  
B. Duty and Motivation  
Duty and motivation, potentially linked in this context, are separately 
important to understanding legal responses to whistleblowing. In Reinier 
Kraakman’s influential account of ex ante strategies for legal enforcement, 
an enforceable duty is essential as the mechanism that enables “private 
parties to avert misconduct when they detect it.”50 Kraakman argues that 
gatekeeper strategies—utilizing private actors who can disrupt misconduct 
by withholding co-operation from wrongdoers, as epitomized by financial 
auditors—are superior to whistleblowers who are subject to a duty to report 
misconduct.51 This is because gatekeeping threatens only a withheld reward 
while mandatory whistleblowing additionally imposes on its targets costs of 
“legal defense, reputational loss, and possible penalties or civil damages.”52 
Given the risk of erroneous whistleblowing (however motivated), its targets 
have incentives to withhold information and avoid actors who may betray 
them, while potential whistleblowers, fearing the personal consequences, 
may avoid reporting wrongdoing.53 Proceeding within a duty-centric 
framework, Kraakman’s analysis does not address implications that follow 
when whistleblowers (like the prototype, Tyler Shultz) are not subject to a 
duty to report suspected misconduct. To be sure, by blowing the whistle an 
actor may breach duties owed to others, as examined below.  
Whistleblowers’ motivations raise two distinct issues: (1) the relevance 
of motivation to how the law characterizes a communication, and (2) the 
 
48. Id. at 294. 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
50. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 57 (1986). 
51. Id. at 58–90.  
52. Id. at 59. 
53. Id. at 60. 











significance of motivation in structuring protections and rewards for 
whistleblowers. Although the motivation with which a whistleblower acts 
can have direct legal consequences for that individual, as in Dirks v. SEC,54 
sometimes motivation is irrelevant. Acting with a public-regarding 
motivation—to reveal fraud—obviated the Dirks officers’ liability for 
illegal tipping under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.55 Given 
that statutory premise for liability, it was unnecessary for the Court to 
examine whether, by making disclosure with the public-regarding objective 
of halting an ongoing fraud, the officers breached their fiduciary duties to 
the corporation. Most likely, revealing the information breached their 
duties.56 Whether they might be shielded from liability by a common law 
privilege is an underexplored question. In tort law, conduct otherwise 
tortious can be privileged in particular circumstances, as when an actor’s 
conduct serves some interest of the public and the harm caused by the 
conduct is offset by the importance of that interest.57 The complex of 
statutes and common law doctrines that protect whistleblowers from 
retaliation by employers reflects a widely-held public commitment that 
should constitute a basis for privilege against breach of fiduciary duty.  
Privilege aside and distinct from any contractual obligations of 
confidentiality, the officers in Dirks—even as former officers—were agents 
who owed the corporation—their principal—a fiduciary duty of loyalty that 
encompassed a specific duty not to use the principal’s confidential 
information for their own purposes or those of a third party.58 Not absolute, 
the duty is not breached when an agent reveals to law enforcement that the 
principal is committing or is about to commit a crime or informs a third 
party who will be harmed by the principal’s illegal conduct.59 And, as noted 
above, whistleblowing-protective statutes and common law doctrine would 
also be a basis for privilege. But in general, within the framework of 
common law agency, an agent’s well-motivated departures from the 
principal’s known preferences breach the agent’s fiduciary duties to the 
principal.60 Likewise, the Akorn insider’s revelations may have been well 
 
54. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
55. Id. at 653–54, 667. 
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2)(agent’s duty “not to use or communicate 
confidential information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party”). 
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (defining “privilege”). Breach 
of fiduciary duty can sound in tort, resulting in liability to the person to whom the duty was owed. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 16 (AM. L. INST. 2020).  
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (AM. L. INST. 2006).  
59. Id. at § 8.05 cmt. c. 
60. Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of 
Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 321, 329–30 (Andrew S. Gold & 
Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). Arguments for a less adamantine framing of an agent’s duty extend only to 
situations in which an agent’s conduct furthers a principal’s known objectives and does not sacrifice 












motivated, but sharing the information with a merger partner surely 
contravened preferences shared by the target’s shareholders and directors to 
proceed with the merger, sharpened by severe business reverses the 
company suffered following the date of the merger agreement. 
In contrast, a whistleblower’s motivation is irrelevant to analysis under 
SOX and Dodd-Frank. What matters under SOX is whether the individual 
“reasonably believes” the information concerns a violation of federal 
prohibitions on fraud or SEC rules and regulations. Under Dodd-Frank, the 
dispositive question is whether the individual provided “information 
relating to” securities law violations to the SEC. It is beside the point why 
the individual determined to provide the information. A public-minded 
motivation to reveal wrongdoing may co-exist with resentment against co-
employees or superiors, the desire to exact revenge or achieve fame, or a 
combination of many motives, including these.61 Seeking to mitigate the 
risk of liability when the information may implicate the whistleblower can 
motivate disclosures,62 although whistleblowing by itself does not confer 
amnesty when it pertains to an individual’s prior criminal conduct.63 This 
fact may help explain why employee-whistleblowers tend to inhabit the tiled 
world, situated lower in an organization’s hierarchy. On the one hand, 
higher-ups, including denizens of the carpeted world, could be sources of 
better information about wrongdoing; on the other hand, that information 
may well inculpate them as direct and knowledgeable participants in 
criminal conduct.64 Motivation is also irrelevant to the legal consequences 
of whistleblowing when an individual has a duty to reveal information, as 
would a gatekeeper with an obligation to make disclosure, such as an auditor 
who fulfills a duty imposed by federal securities law.65 Nor does a 
whistleblower’s motivation necessarily bear on the quality of the 
whistleblower’s report, something of a theoretical issue in any event given 
the imponderable nature of subjective motivation in this context.  
 
61. See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2215 (noting the mix of considerations that 
motivate whistleblowing); see also Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell & Aaron Stenz, Bad Agent, Good 
Citizen?, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631, 1644–45 (2020) (stressing variety of motivations for lawyer 
whistleblowers).  
62. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2245 (reporting that in around 35% of cases in 
study, avoiding liability appeared relevant to whistleblower). 
63. Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the Whistleblower’s Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
2215, 2227 (2017) (“[W]histleblowing . . . does not confer amnesty.” (quoting Julie Rose O’Sullivan, 
“Private Justice” and FCPA Enforcement: Should the SEC Whistleblower Program Include a Qui Tam 
Provision?, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 78 (2016))).  
64. Id. at 2219. 
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii); see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding 
Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 330–31 (2007) (differentiating between gatekeepers, who 
generally report within organizations, and whistleblowers, who may report to the public or to authorities, 
and terming auditors, subject to statutory whistleblowing obligations, an instance of “nonvolunteer” 
whistleblowers).  











Assumptions or theories about whistleblowers’ motivations are crucial 
to the operation and effectiveness of legal doctrines and other structures that 
afford protection against retaliation or offer financial incentives for 
whistleblowing, such as Dodd-Frank. All operate against a backdrop in 
which the practical consequences for known whistleblowers can be severe. 
One quantitative study found that monetary incentives are associated with 
more cases in which whistleblowing leads to the revelation of major 
financial fraud, contrasting fraud cases in the health care sector with all 
others.66 The study—focused on cases prior to Dodd-Frank—attributes this 
difference to the fact that successful fraud claims originating in the health-
care sector are more likely to be eligible for monetary rewards under the 
federal False Claims Act due to the significant governmental presence in 
procurement.67 But overall the study finds it “surprising” that employees 
decide to blow the whistle given its association with wrongful discharge 
claims.68 
Less formally, identified whistleblowers often find themselves 
ostracized and shunned in many ways.69 For Tyler Shultz, the prototypical 
whistleblower introduced earlier, a highly atypical aftermath followed his 
revelations about Theranos. To be sure, he reports that his parents incurred 
$400,000 in legal fees when Theranos responded aggressively through its 
lawyers, threatening and demanding the execution of non-disclosure 
agreements.70 But post-Theranos Mr. Shultz stayed in Silicon Valley in the 
medical-testing business, co-founding a startup to develop a line of research 
from his time at Stanford and raising $37 million in early-stage venture 
capital funding secured in 2018.71 That his experience is widely viewed as 
exceptional underscores the overhang of well-known adverse consequences 
in shaping whistleblowers’ motivations. Additionally, many insiders who 
are aware of indicia of illegal conduct lack resources of the nature and 
magnitude available to Mr. Shultz through his family and other 
relationships. 
Reframing whistleblowing as an acknowledged component of corporate 
governance—in particular, as a source of private information that materially 
facilitates the effectiveness of internal control systems—can help overcome 
powerful norms against being seen as a “rat” or a “snitch,” and thus 
vulnerable to retaliation by wrongdoers as well as by other actors “who 
 
66. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2215. 
67. Id. at 2245.  
68. Id.  
69. Id. at 2251. 
70. CARREYROU, supra note 24, at 287. 













enforce the social code.”72 Situating the response to whistleblower reports 
within the board’s suite of responsibilities should add credibility to 
assurances a corporation provides employees by garnering the attention of 
high-level governance actors and the cohort of lawyers who advise them. 
Along these lines, some corporations now define whistleblowing as an 
obligation, not just a right.73 In experimental research, when whistleblowing 
is cast as a duty, more of it occurs, arguably due to the increased social status 
ascribed to whistleblowers subject to duties to report.74 Additionally, 
credible assurances that internally-made disclosures will remain 
confidential and will be investigated by personnel who are organizationally 
distant from those accused of wrongdoing should reduce perceived risks of 
retaliation and signal that the value of whistleblowing is acknowledged.75 
Otherwise, it is open to debate how powerfully financial incentives can 
operate, especially for higher-placed (often older) insiders who have much 
to lose if excluded from the corporation that employs them or the industry, 
or demeaned and demoted in rank and status within them.  
Separately, by rewarding whistleblowers, might the law interfere with an 
individual’s intrinsic motivation to blow the whistle because it is the right 
thing to do? Raising this possibility, Emad Atiq questions the impact on 
financially-incentivized whistleblowers themselves, who might regret 
having become even more “beholden to financial interests.”76 On the other 
hand, recasting whistleblowing as a duty owed to a corporation or 
encompassing it as an acknowledged component of corporate governance 
structures might strengthen—or “crowd in”—intrinsic motivation through a 
strong signal of encouragement. Either (or both) could also trigger the 
ethical value of fulfilling one’s obligations, whether imposed directly by 
positive law or via a corporation’s internal rules and policies.77 
 
72. Miller, supra note 4, at 996 n.50. 
73. Id. at 996. 
74. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of 
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1206 
(2010). 
75. See David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory 
Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 615 (2014) 
(observing that higher-quality tips from higher-placed sources may require strengthening protections 
against retaliation, not increased bounties). 
76. Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of Legal 
Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1097 (2014). 
77. See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Compliance Management Systems: Do They Make a 
Difference?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol 
eds., forthcoming Apr. 2021) (manuscript at 21–22) (on file with author) (acknowledging that heavy 
emphasis on compliance may potentially interfere with intrinsic motivation while also acknowledging 
that compliance and respect for the rule of law are themselves important ethical values). For an overview 
of arguments and social-science evidence concerning crowding-out and crowding-in effects, see 
Deborah A. DeMott, The Domains of Loyalty: Relationships Between Fiduciary Obligations and 
Intrinsic Motivation, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (2021). 











Additionally, and distinct from the power of social sanctions against 
whistleblowing, the overall efficacy of reward programs in generating 
information useful to law-enforcement agencies (including the SEC)78 is 
tied to the robustness of anti-retaliation assurances through a complex and 
highly individualized motivational mix of loss-aversion and gain-seeking 
that’s hard to unscramble. 
II. THE TEXTURE AND CONTENT OF WHISTLEBLOWING LAW 
The evolution of whistleblowing law in the United States fits within a 
larger pattern that typifies the ongoing development of corporate law and 
corporate governance as articulated in two recent accounts. In its 2017 
edition the foundational book The Anatomy of Corporate Law concludes 
with a chapter, Beyond the Anatomy.79 Its authors, acknowledging the 
book’s ahistorical and functional methodology, in one section venture 
“Beyond the Present” of corporate law and see a “fundamental rethink of 
corporate laws . . . under way in many countries, partly as a reaction to 
corporate scandals and the alleged failure of corporate governance at 
financial institutions” that preceded the world-wide financial crisis of 2008–
2010.80 Likewise on the table as current issues are “the goals of corporate 
law,” which for these authors implicate the design of regulatory measures 
to assure that the social costs of corporate activity are reflected in 
corporations’ financial results.81 Writing in the same era about the evolution 
of corporate governance as a path-dependent process not isolated from shifts 
in broader social and economic concerns, Ronald Gilson observes that 
although much of corporate governance is not dictated or specified by law, 
governance matters may become legally specified “when legislatures 
conclude that self-generated governance is less effective than social welfare 
demands.”82 Whistleblowing law develops responsively and to a 
considerable extent episodically, whether through legislative enactment or 
common law adjudication, generally following in the wake of outrage at 
wrongdoing known to insiders within organizations. A sketch of that 
evolution follows. 
 
78. See Amanda M. Rose, Calculating SEC Whistleblower Awards: A Theoretical Approach, 72 
VAND. L. REV. 2047, 2050 (2019) (arguing the initial premise in SEC’s calculation of awards should be 
“help[ing] the SEC in its deterrence mission,” with the implication that awards should be structured to 
reward tips that create more benefits than costs for SEC). 
79. John Armour, Luca Enriques, Mariana Pargendler & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Beyond the 
Anatomy, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 267 
(3d ed. 2017). 
80. Id. at 269. 
81. Id. at 271. 












Historical accounts of whistleblowing law trace it to 1863. Congress 
adopted (and President Lincoln signed) the False Claims Act (FCA)83 when 
it became clear that many suppliers had provided substandard services and 
goods to Union troops in the midst of the Civil War.84 From its beginning, 
the FCA has included a provision authorizing qui tam suits brought by 
whistleblowers on behalf of the United States. Under the FCA as revised in 
1986, a whistleblower may receive up to thirty percent of the proceeds of a 
lawsuit, recovered from the defendant in a judgment on a claim stemming 
from fraud in federal spending, procurement, or contracting.85 Thus, bounty 
or reward systems to incentivize whistleblowing have a long lineage in the 
United States that predate statutory anti-retaliation protections. For 
employees of the federal government, anti-retaliation measures date to 1912 
and the Lloyd-LaFollette Act86 (later amended by the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1978), enacted in response to Presidential “gag orders” that Congress 
understood to stymie its ability to obtain relevant information from federal 
civil-service employees.87 Further strengthening the position of 
whistleblowers, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989 created 
the Office of Special Counsel to investigate allegations of illegal personnel 
practices, among other measures. 88 In 2012, the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act addressed the WPA’s lack of specified remedies and 
clarified the breadth of disclosures protected by the statutory regime, which 
now applies to disclosures of violations of law, rule, or regulation, or “gross 
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”89 
Notwithstanding their present breadth, these statutes apply only to 
employees of the federal government, with non-identical counterparts in 
 
83. Presently codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. 
84. The False Claims Act, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR., https://www.whistleblowers.org/prote 
ct-the-false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/B83X-7UH4].  
85. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). 
86. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act was added as section six to the Postal Service Appropriations Act 
of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555, in response to “gag orders” from Presidents Taft and (Teddy) 
Roosevelt that prohibited employees of executive branch departments from seeking to influence 
legislation except through departmental heads. The Senate perceived the orders as enabling the 
Executive Branch to bar Congress from access to sources of information that should be open to it. The 
Act applied to civil-service employees and assured their rights to petition Congress or furnish 
information to it. It provided safeguards against the arbitrary dismissal of civil servants who attempted 
to communicate with Congress. For background, see https://whistleblowersblog.org/2012/08/articles/go 
vernment-whistleblowers/happy-birthday-lloyd-la-follette-act/. 
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 7211. 
88. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).  
89. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, sec. 103, § 
2302(a)(2), 126 Stat. 1465, 1466. 











state statutes that are mostly focused on protecting against retaliation.90 For 
private-sector employees, statutory protection for whistleblowers at the 
federal level has a much shorter history that begins with SOX in 2002. As 
elaborated above, like Dodd-Frank, SOX applies only when a 
whistleblower’s report pertains to specified types of misconduct. 
Additionally, statutes applicable to specific industries may address 
whistleblowing but also contain significant limitations on coverage. For 
example, although the health and pharmaceutical industries are heavily 
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) through authority 
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), the FFDCA 
does not create whistleblower protections applicable to the pharmaceutical 
and cosmetic industries.91 In 2011, the Food Safety Modernization Act 
authorized whistleblower-protective rules for the food industry.92 Thus, the 
extent of legally-mandated protection for employee whistleblowers in the 
pharmaceutical industry and in health care turns on applicable state law. On 
the other hand, the oldest of the federal statues—the FCA—may create a 
viable whistleblower claim when misconduct implicates false claims for 
payment by the federal government and the employee-whistleblower 
proceeds with a qui tam action.93  
 
90. In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, whistleblower legislation was preceded by 
scandals and a series of public inquiries. These focused on the collapse of the BCCI bank and a 
catastrophic incident at a recreational facility in which an employee who identified safety lapses was 
dismissed after reporting them to management. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Terry Morehead Dworkin 
& David Lewis, Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public 
Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 883 (2004). The Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA), enacted in 1998, 
creates an express exception to the duty of confidentiality that an employee owes to an employer. See 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23/content 
s [https://perma.cc/K3Y8-9T5V], incorporated into the Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18 (UK), https: 
//www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/contents [https://perma.cc/XLQ7-93JZ], subsequently 
modified by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/2013/24/contents [https://perma.cc/KZ6C-SQ25]. PIDA, which offers no financial incentives for 
whistleblowing, in most instances requires that internal reporting precede reporting to external 
audiences. PIDA’s structure requires litigation before expert employee tribunals with costs beyond the 
reach of most employees; the statute recommends but does not require that employers adopt internal-
reporting procedures. For these criticisms, among others, see ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GRP. FOR 
WHISTLEBLOWING, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE PERSONAL COST OF DOING THE RIGHT THING AND THE 
COST TO SOCIETY OF IGNORING IT (2019), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/88d04c_9754e54bc641443db 
902cd963687cb55.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR68-DS53]. 
91. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i. 
92. See id. § 399d. 
93. For a prominent example, see United States ex rel. Eckard v. GlaxoSmithKline, No. 04-CV 
-10375-JLT (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 2011) (Bloomberg Law). Eckard involved false claims arising from 
chronic and serious deficiencies in quality control at a manufacturing plant. This led to the public release 
of adulterated and defective pharmaceutical drugs that harmed those who bought them as well as false 
claims for payment by federal and state purchasers, as well as payment under Medicare and state 
Medicaid programs. The whistleblower—the corporation’s manager for quality control—internally 
reported code violations that were not adequately investigated, then was downsized out of a job. The qui 
tam case settled for $600 million plus interest. See Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n v. GlaxoSmithKline 












On the state level, the District of Columbia and all fifty states have some 
form of whistleblower-protective statute. These vary widely in content and 
scope94 but are important protections for at-will employees.95 Many statutes 
were enacted in the wake of specific incidents when lawmakers believed 
that employee reporting could have prevented or ameliorated harm.96 Seven 
states require a whistleblower to report internally before turning to an 
external channel.97 Common law doctrines may also afford protection; in 
most but not all states98 wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is 
tortious.99 As applied to whistleblowers, the tort protects employees who 
report or inquire about conduct believed to be illegal or to violate an 
established professional or occupational code of conduct,100 in particular 
one that threatens injury to a public interest as opposed to harm internalized 
to the corporation itself.101 The wrongful-discharge tort, plus state 
whistleblower-protective statutes, undergird the argument advanced above 
that although employee-whistleblowing may theoretically breach fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality, it should be protected by privilege 
under common law principles of tort law.102  
In general, the fragmentary and episode-driven quality of whistleblowing 
law in the United States undercuts its capacity to facilitate effective systems 
of internal control and to overcome deeply entrenched opposition to 
organizational actors who reveal evidence suggestive of others’ misconduct, 
whether externally or through internal channels. Acknowledging 
whistleblowing within formal organizational law would contribute an 
overlay of uniformity, at least as across business entities formed and 
governed under any particular state’s law. 
III. REFRAMING WHISTLEBLOWING WITHIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Recast as actors within a corporate governance framework, 
whistleblowers, the private information they reveal, and the frictions they 
create could facilitate the ability of directors and senior officers to better 
assure that the organization complies with positive law. Their ability to do 
so is all the more pressing in an era when, as Donald Langevoort writes, a 
 
94. For many specifics, see Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of 
State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000). 
95. Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the 
Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 888 (2002).  
96. Callahan et al., supra note 90, at 882. 
97. Id. at 891. 
98. New York is a significant exception. See Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 2012). 
99. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
100. Id. § 5.02(e). 
101. For the leading precedent, see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 57–60.  











parade of “all the more garish” corporate wrongdoing seems to co-exist with 
widespread adoption of internal compliance systems.103 This section opens 
by sketching two recent developments in corporate law. In their 
articulations of directors’ duties, Delaware courts have reinvigorated the 
component of directors’ duty of loyalty that focuses on legal and regulatory 
compliance, assigning a proactive role to the board.104 Separately, in one 
jurisdiction, organizational law explicitly addresses whistleblowing and 
subjects directors to specific responsibilities.105 The section then elaborates 
on why whistleblowers should be formally embraced as components of 
corporate governance. While not a panacea for corporate misconduct, a 
broader understanding of governance mechanisms and actors expands the 
potential range of responses to the risk of wrongdoing.  
A. Evolution in Corporate Law 
Like corporate governance, corporate law itself is less static than some 
academic accounts suggest and is at least potentially responsive to external 
circumstances. To be sure, it is always difficult—writing in the present—to 
discern blips versus developments with staying power. With that caveat, 
consider recent shifts in the Delaware jurisprudence of directors’ duties as 
they bear on compliance with positive law. In 1996, the Court of Chancery 
famously articulated a fiduciary duty of oversight regarding legal and 
regulatory compliance in the Caremark case.106 A decade later, the 
Delaware Supreme Court situated the duty as a component of directors’ duty 
of loyalty, with the important consequence that a director could not be 
shielded against liability for monetary damages on a Caremark claim 
through exculpatory language in the corporation’s charter, in contrast with 
a claim grounded in a breach of the duty of care.107 Assessing developments 
over the next decade, scholarly commentators find grounds for pessimism 
about the potential of Caremark claims and their potential impact on 
directors’ engagement with compliance.108 Cases from that era, few 
 
103. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 942. To be sure, it is likely impossible to know the full extent 
to which internal compliance measures discovered wrongdoing. An earlier study (using large reported 
financial frauds from 1996–2004) estimated that 34% of frauds were detected internally but also 
cautioned this proportion may be an underestimate. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 3, at 2225. 
104. See infra text accompanying notes 103–118. 
105. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-b (LexisNexis 2021). 
106. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
107. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). Exculpatory clauses are permitted to the extent 
consistent with the relevant provision in Delaware’ corporation statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
102(b)(7) (2021).  
108. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. 













resulting in liability,109 imposed a pleading threshold that required the 
allegation of facts supporting an inference that a majority of the board 
intentionally caused a violation of the law or consciously disregarded it.110 
Other events in the course of a lawsuit might also defeat liability on an 
otherwise meritorious claim.111 For conduct occurring deeper within the 
organization, liability risks for directors were few unless the facts were 
egregious and the corporation had no board-installed compliance system at 
all.  
Both the tone and content of the Supreme Court’s analysis of Caremark 
claims shifted in 2019’s Marchand v. Barnhill, in which an ice-cream 
manufacturer’s allegedly shoddy manufacturing practices led to a listeria 
outbreak that contaminated its product, causing three deaths plus an 
operational shutdown and liquidity crisis for the company.112 Quality-
control issues were reported to members of management, who did not report 
them to the board until the company issued its first product recalls; the board 
thereafter engaged in no in-depth discussion.113 The court held that the 
company’s nominal compliance with food-safety regulations did not suffice 
to establish that the board had implemented a system to monitor safety 
issues at the board level; the complaint alleged an absence of board-level 
committees or practices to inform the board about safety concerns.114 And 
ice cream was the company’s sole product, for which food-safety risks 
carried grave consequences for human health.115 Professional commentary 
on Marchand treats it as a significant development, one law-firm memo 
 
care by business judgment rule, and “retreat” of corporate law from turf now occupied by internal 
compliance functions); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 941 (characterizing Caremark as an impetus to 
“just do something” that invited a check-the-box approach to compliance); Miller, supra note 4, at 986 
(noting “curiously ambivalent quality” in Delaware’s approach to compliance, imposing significant 
obligations on directors but following through with liability only when directors do not “manifest even 
minimal efforts”).  
109. Miller, supra note 4, at 986 n.14 (generalizing that cases generating liability typically involve 
“egregious facts” plus “companies operated out of countries with poor reputations for corporate 
governance”).  
110. City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 60 n.75 (Del. 2017). 
111. See In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 
2176479, at *20–21 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2011) (directors who knew that corporation had already pled 
guilty to criminal charges stemming from unsafe operating conditions and had suffered other adverse 
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adversarial relationship with regulators and by failing to assure that corporation adopted policies to 
comply with safety regulations); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., 160 A.3d 
484, 497 (Del. Ch. 2017) (dismissing derivative claims because plaintiffs lost standing due to 
corporation’s merger, noting that Caremark claim would otherwise have been viable).  
112. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). 
113. Id. at 812–14. 
114. Id. at 813, 822–23. 
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concluding that it “[b]reathes [n]ew [l]ife” into Caremark claims.116 Given 
the case’s unquestionably bad facts, Marchand’s potential resuscitation of 
directors’ liability should not be overstated, but the court’s opinion seems 
almost nonplussed at times by the obliviousness to risk displayed by the 
corporation’s senior management and its directors.117 But the facts alleged 
sufficed to raise an inference that the directors failed even to attempt to 
assure the presence of “reasonable information and reporting systems” as 
Caremark requires, perhaps scaling back a bit on standards for establishing 
conscious disregard and instead emphasizing the nature and magnitude of 
the risks involved.118  
Marchand is too recent as a precedent to assess its full force, let alone its 
staying power over time, but the Court of Chancery treats it as refocusing 
attention on the gravity of a particular compliance risk in the environment 
in which a corporation operates. In In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative 
Litigation, the directors of a biopharma start-up allegedly ignored multiple 
warning signs concerning the efficacy in fighting cancer of the company’s 
most promising drug in development, which violated internal clinical trial 
protocols and FDA regulations.119 Under Marchand, these allegations 
supported a Caremark claim because they concerned a “mission critical” 
regulatory compliance risk for which Marchand requires that the directors 
exercise their oversight function “more rigorously.”120 To be sure, 
whistleblower reports do not figure in either case, but both cases may be 
indicia of a turn in corporate-law jurisprudence toward more vigorous 
engagement with the importance of legal and regulatory compliance. In both 
cases this turn was framed as “mission critical” to the corporation’s ongoing 
viability as a business. And in both, the risks implicated human life and 
health, not just business risks for the corporation.121 
 
116. FREDERICK B. THOMAS, JODI A. SIMALA, ANDREW J. NOREUIL, RYAM H. FERRIS & THOMAS 
C. SANTORA., MAYER BROWN, LEGAL UPDATE: DELAWARE DECISION BREATHES NEW LIFE INTO BAD 
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waved before it, not just by internal tests but by food-safety regulators “until it was too late.” Marchand, 
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flawed financial reporting (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821)). 
120. In re Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13. 
121. For further discussion of the resurgence of Caremark claims and the causes, see Roy Shapira, 












Corporate law also evolves at the level of change in organizational 
statutes that enable corporate formation and furnish both mandatory and 
enabling rules on an ongoing basis. As amended in 2013, the New York 
Not-for-Profit Corporation Act mandates that directors of corporations with 
twenty or more employees and revenues in excess of $1 million in the prior 
fiscal year adopt and oversee the implementation of compliance policies 
with whistleblower components.122 As amended, the Act mandates the 
contents of whistleblower policies: policies must (1) protect against 
retaliation, persons “who report suspected improper conduct”; (2) provide 
for a designated administrator who shall be a director, officer, or employee; 
and (3) assure that the subject of a whistleblower complaint is not present 
for deliberations concerning it.123 Still open to dispute is whether the 
statutory provision supports an implied private cause of action for 
whistleblowing employees who suffer retaliation.124 
Reconsidering the governance role of whistleblowers is consistent with 
these recent indicia of evolution in corporate law and governance. 
Consistent with Ronald Gilson’s observation, legislatures as well as courts 
specify the law further when “self-generated governance is less than social 
welfare demands.”125 In this light, scholarship that premises corporate 
governance as singly focused on agency costs stemming from misaligned 
incentives as between shareholders and managers can seem dated or 
incomplete.126 Likewise, understanding governance as a purely internal 
arrangement that does not generate substantial effects on third parties that 
 
122. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-b (LexisNexis 2021). The amendment, part of the 
Non-Profit Revitalization Act of 2013, also applies to the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. Non-Profit 
Revitalization Act of 2013, ch. 549, 2013 N.Y. Laws 1400. A further amendment in 2016 eliminated a 
requirement that whistleblower policies be overseen and adopted only by independent directors. Act of 
Nov. 28, 2016, ch. 466, sec. 11, § 715-b(b)(2), 2016 N.Y. Laws 947, 951. By mandating the adoption of 
whistleblower policies, the amendment goes further than IRS Form 990 for charitable non-profits, which 
asks whether the organization has a whistleblower policy. See Jean Gordon Carter, Best Practices for 
Exempt Organizations and Form 990, J. OF ACCT. (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.journalofaccountancy.co 
m/issues/2010/sep/20102725.html [https://perma.cc/G4D5-V7KA]. These provisions (and the Form 990 
question) complement a portion of SOX, which imposes criminal liability in the event of retaliation 
against whistleblowers who report federal offences and in the event of destruction of records with intent 
to obstruct a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(e), 1519.  
123. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715-b (LexisNexis 2021).  
124. See Joshi v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in N.Y., No. 17-CV-4112, 2018 WL 2417846, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2018) (implying private cause of action given statute’s express concern with 
employees of non-profits and noting split between state-court cases). Compare Pietra v. Poly Prep 
Country Day Sch., No. 506586/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 7, 2016) (implying cause of action), with Ferris 
v. Lustgarten Found., No. 606353/16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2017) (declining to imply cause of action).  
125. Gilson, supra note 1, at 8. 
126. See Christopher M. Bruner, Methods of Comparative Corporate Governance, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Afra Afsharipour & Martin Gelter eds., 
forthcoming June 2021) (manuscript at 9) (on file with author). 











cannot be addressed by other bodies of law or regulation can slight the 
contemporary significance of internal compliance systems and processes.127  
B. Whistleblowers as Governance Actors 
Repositioned as governance actors, whistleblowers could better facilitate 
corporate compliance with positive law. This objective entails focusing on 
internal reporting because it serves as a more immediate source of 
information to inform managerial decisions and the board.128 
Whistleblowers might formally be designated governance actors through 
two routes: one specific to particular firms, the other more general. As some 
corporations have done,129 whistleblowing could be made a duty imposed 
by individual firms on employees and other agents. What the duty would 
specifically require, and how the corporation handles whistleblower reports, 
would fall within the decision-making province of individual firms. 
Alternatively (or additionally), state-level organizational law could address 
whistleblowing, imposing requirements comparable to those in the New 
York statute discussed above.130 Changes at the level of organizational law 
would assure greater uniformity, at least for internal whistleblowing, and 
may more effectively engage the attention of boards of directors and senior 
management. What both routes share is their potential to signal—to 
potential whistleblowers, their colleagues, and audiences external to the 
corporation—that reporting potential wrongdoing is compatible with the 
corporation’s own norms, thereby helping to offset reluctance to report and 
reduce the adverse extra-legal consequences anticipated and borne by many 
whistleblowers. Both routes, like formal measures more generally, 
“signalize” (in Lon Fuller’s term) the appropriateness of certain conduct.131 
Both have potential to defuse the effect of cultural inhibitions against 
reporting potential wrongdoing and to offset if not rewrite extra-legal (or 
cultural) understandings of “what is ‘not done.’”132 
 
127. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 108, at 2079 (stating that “corporate governance arrangements 
both are and ought to be the product of a bargain between shareholders and managers,” in contrast to 
compliance, externally imposed pursuant to “the directive of a government enforcer”). 
128. The independent value of external reporting is beyond the scope of this article, as are the 
complex causal links between it and internal reporting. 
129. See Miller, supra note 4, at 996. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 122–124. 
131. For the “signalize” term, see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 
799, 801 (1941). Fuller’s specific focus is the functions served by the formal consideration requirement 
for contract formation, but his point reaches more broadly.  
132. On culture in the context of corporate governance as a widely known and often unspoken 
understanding of “what goes with what” and “[w]hat is ‘not done,’” see Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law 
in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, supra 












Addressing whistleblowing through state-level organizational law has 
the stronger prospect for enlisting the attention of directors and senior 
management because amendments to foundational organizational statutes 
can impose mandates on the board itself. This route may additionally hold 
more promise in circumstances in which some directors and CEOs could be 
tempted to suppress whistleblowers’ reports or avoid their implications 
because it underscores the linkage between whistleblowing policies and 
legal compliance, as well as their institutional gravity. To be sure, aspects 
of implementation would be delegated, whether to board committees, 
officers, or deeper within the organization, but the initial and non-delegable 
responsibility concerning system design should be the board’s. Further 
gravitas could be associated with a whistleblowing system if a committee 
of the board—perhaps the audit committee or a committee charged with risk 
management—bore explicit responsibility for ongoing monitoring and 
reporting to the entire board.  
Additionally, enlisting organs of governance at this level could increase 
the likelihood that whistleblower reports are used more effectively, 
regardless of which personnel bear front-line responsibility for initial 
investigations. Failure to make good use of such reports is an ongoing 
refrain in retrospective studies of corporate scandals. Veronica Root 
Martinez identifies the significance of informational silos in large 
organizations, aggravated by one-by-one investigations of whistleblower 
reports unaccompanied by aggregation.133 Thus, although Wells Fargo had 
robust compliance programs based on the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, the bank became known as an exemplar of persistent and 
avoidable misconduct, evidenced in retrospect by whistleblower reports of 
retaliation against employees who attempted to alert their superiors to 
fraudulent activity.134 And cross-silo patterns suggestive of failed incentive 
structures and weak internal controls went unidentified.135 Reducing the 
height of information silos and imposing the broader analytic perspective 
requisite to aggregation require direction and support from senior levels, 
which a mandatory role for the board and a board committee should 
facilitate. 
Finally, state-level organizational law is the source of directors’ duties, 
including the Caremark and Marchand duties to monitor detailed above. 
Ongoing concern at the board level with a corporation’s compliance with 
positive law and regulation would be facilitated by more effective structures 
and practices concerning whistleblowing, which through its propensity to 
create friction can supplement and correct information the board otherwise 
 
133. Martinez, supra note 2, at 294.  
134. Id. at 252 n.6. 
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receives, including that traceable to more routinized compliance functions. 
Additionally, developments in jurisprudence like Marchand, along with 
changes in organizational statutes, generally require advice from counsel to 
the board, as would compliance with a mandate to adopt and administer a 
system to engage with reports from whistleblowers. All should strengthen 
the ability of counsel to give advice underlining the importance of engaging 
with the efficacy of compliance. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate law and corporate governance are mutable and porous, not 
static and closed. These properties enable them to respond to changed 
circumstances, which at present include assessments that many internal 
compliance systems have not proven adequate to meet the challenge of 
deterring and detecting corporate misconduct. Whistleblowers—
prototypically denizens of the tiled world who reveal information that 
confounds accounts endorsed by higher-ups in the carpeted world—hold 
promise as resources. Academic accounts of corporate governance and the 
actors who populate governance structures should no longer exclude them. 
Nor should formal organizational law. 
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